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At dusk in Mexico, a bat flashes low over a coffee plantation,
swiping a moth off a leaf and disappearing into the night. In a large city
park halfway around the world, a jay screeches shrilly as it snaps up an
acorn and swoops away, burrowing it neatly for the winter. In Texas,
100 million bats pour out from caves and from under bridges, feeding in
a frenzy over 10,000 acres of cotton plantations. And in a Hawaiian
forest, a thrush flutters down, nabs a red berry, and swoops to a perch,
dropping the seed in alarm when the shadow of a hawk passes overhead.
What do all of these actions have in common? They all involve the
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feeding habits of birds and bats, our winged cousins. They also
illustrate two frequently unrecognized ecosystem services: seed
dispersal and pest control, services that are provided for free every day,
all over the world.1
The above description details, in an important sense, a discovery.
By acknowledging the processes through which these winged creatures
participate in an ecosystem, we have discovered how humans rely on the
continuity of such processes. This discovery invokes the notion of
ecosystem services, which include the “wide range of conditions and
processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that are
part of them, help sustain and fulfill human life.”2 Mitigation of storm
energy in wetlands, crop pollination, carbon sequestration, and wildlife
rearing are examples of the processes occurring in functioning
ecosystems that provide substantial benefits to humans and human wellbeing.
Informational mandates included in natural resource statutes should
be effective vehicles for integrating the valuation of ecosystem services
into resource management decisions. The National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”),3 for instance, requires that the adverse impacts
from a given action be assessed before an agency commits to an action,
and the value of ecosystems to human welfare would seem relevant to
that inquiry. Yet the effort to integrate ecosystem services valuation into
law has yielded complicated and unsatisfactory results. The controversy
in Clinch Coalition v. Damon,4 which involved an informational
challenge to a proposed timber sale, illustrates a dismissive judicial
disposition toward the valuation of ecosystem services as merely “a
particular economic accounting methodology.”5 The Clinch Coalition
decision is problematic for the district court’s understanding of the
informational purposes of a variety of natural resources statutes and for
the manner in which the court subjects ecosystem services assessment to
agency discretion.6 The Clinch Coalition decision is important for
1. Heather Tallis & Stephen Polasky, Assessing Multiple Ecosystem Services: An Integrated
Tool for the Real World, in NATURAL CAPITAL: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MAPPING ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES 34, 39 (Peter Kareiva et al. eds., 2011).
2. Gretchen Daily et al., Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human Societies by
Natural Ecosystems, 2 Issues in Ecology 1, 2 (1997) [hereinafter Daily et al., Benefits Supplied by
Natural Ecosystems].
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (1970).
4. Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004).
5. Id. at 380-381.
6. Id.
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highlighting the informational role that regulation should play in
ensuring the continuing availability of benefits provided by ecological
resources.7
This article explores the Clinch Coalition decision to understand
why the court would perpetuate a process that systematically rejects the
relevance and value of ecosystem processes in the information gathering
exercise entailed in these environmental regulations.8 The discussion
begins with an introduction to ecosystem services as a study of human
dependency on the services provided by functioning ecosystems. In the
second section, the article turns to the Clinch Coalition decision to
outline the arguments relied upon by the court to legitimize the Forest
Service’s decision to avoid an ecosystem services analysis.9 The article
then presents the Clinch Coalition decision as an illustration of a
fundamental misunderstanding of ecosystem services and their relevance
and value in environmental regulation.10
This article suggests that, by characterizing ecosystem services
valuation as merely an alternative economic analysis or accounting
method, the court highlighted an important informational goal for the
next generation of environmental law: if environmental regulation is
intended to facilitate a more efficient management of resources by
correcting for resource market inefficiencies resulting from incomplete
information, regulatory intervention should employ investigatory
methodologies that result in the production of a more informed resource
management decision. This article first questions whether ecosystem
services valuation is indeed an alternative methodology. This section
describes ecosystem services analysis as a means of economic and
environmental valuation that is more inclusive than a commodity-based
analysis: an analysis of ecosystem services is a more relevant and
complete understanding of economics and environmental decisionmaking, not alternative methodology. Therefore, by rejecting the call
for an ecosystem services analysis, the court allowed the agency to
ignore relevant information about ecosystem impacts: ecosystem
services analysis demands a more inclusive estimation of the opportunity
cost of using and losing the ecosystems that produce timber, fish, and
other goods and services, as well as the benefits of maintaining the flow
of the goods and services that ecosystems produce.
Second, this article concerns how to construct the notion of
7.
8.
9.
10.
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“information” to improve the information gathering exercise that is
found in “action-forcing” statutes such as NEPA.11 Ecosystem services
research supplies information on both economic values and ecosystem
processes. Excluding an accounting of “ecosystem services” can
produce decisions that do not accurately or efficiently reflect the
interdependency between ecological and economic wealth.
Understanding natural resources in terms of the value of ecosystem
services that they produce helps to contextualize the relationships
between public needs, private wealth, and the cost of ecosystem loss.
Such information falls squarely into the informational mandate of our
resource management goals, but more importantly, such information is
currently excluded from most environmental and economic valuations.
I. NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION
Historically, markets have excluded information on ecosystem
processes and services, at least where those processes and services have
not been commodified.
In the transition period between the
environmental decade of the 1970s and the present, the field of vision
has changed in irretrievable ways.12 This is demonstrated by the fact
that the practice of allowing markets to determine the types of
information that are considered valuable and relevant is being
abandoned, as evidenced by the increasing frequency with which we can
point to market failures as evidence that market mechanisms, by
themselves, are unable to adequately identify and value all of the
relevant and necessary information. Environmental regulation has
largely been designed to deal with environmental externalities, albeit in
a variety of ways. Some laws are intended to correct the social,
ecological, or economic effects or market failure, such as hazardous
waste laws or technology-based air and water regulations. Other
environmental laws seek to prevent market failures that result from
decision making based on inadequate information or misinformation.
This article focuses on the latter—informational type of
environmental regulation. Although the informational approach to
environmental regulation appears straightforward, little has been written
on the character of information that would simultaneously satisfy the
letter of the law and respond to the economic efficiency purpose of the
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (1970).
12. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004) (detailing
developments of environmental law); KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1945–1970 (2009) (Same).
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regulatory effort.13 The salient question for the next generation of
environmental law, from this perspective, relates both to the character of
the information sought, and to the whether the process employed in the
regulatory schemes insures the incorporation of standards for more
economically relevant and environmentally valuable information.
The ecological economics approach of ecosystem services provides
some insights and direction for answering these questions. Resource
valuation that incorporates ecosystem services empowers resource
managers to wield both ecology and economics to capture the value of
ecosystem processes that law has long ignored. This section presents the
manner in which ecosystem services research offers a management
framework that identifies and accounts for the services provided by
natural resources that human societies rely upon. This section also
examines NEPA to illustrate the mechanics and purposes of
informational regulation.
A.

Ecosystem Services

Ecosystems “provide basic life support for human and animal
populations and are the source of spiritual, aesthetic, and other human
experiences that are valued in many ways by many people.”14 In some
instances, ecosystems provide benefits by producing goods such as
timber and fuels, seafood, fruits and nuts, as well as ingredients used in
the production of pharmaceuticals and other industrial products.
However, ecosystems are valuable in other ways that are more difficult
to quantify. The study of ecosystem services aims to develop
information about and valuations of ecosystem goods and services that
recognize the essential services that ecosystem processes provide.15
Ecosystem services analyses typically identify the types of

13. See, e.g., David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as
Regulation, 31 ELR 10773 (July 2001); Bradley Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm, 89 GEO.L.J. 257,
260 n.7 (2001) (discussing evidence of positive correlations between disclosure requirements and
emission reductions); Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information
Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435 (1995) (“The principal policy effort addressing environmental
degradation has been focused on the supply side of markets—laws and regulations directly
controlling emissions of pollution and disposal of wastes. Promoting green consumerism can
complement the vast array of environmental laws and regulations by altering the demand for
products.”).
14. EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., VALUING THE PROTECTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND
SERVICES
(EPA-SAB-09-012)
8
(May
2009),
available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/WebBOARD/ValProtEcolSys&Serv.
15. See Daily et al., Benefits Supplied by Natural Ecosystems, supra note 2.
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ecosystem services that have not been valued in the marketplace.16
Although we may have a sense of the value of bananas and clean water,
the ecological processes17 that produce bananas (goods) and filter water
(services) have not been valued in the marketplace;18 these services
“have no market value for the simple reason that no markets exist in
which they can be exchanged.”19 Most of these services have not been
recognized because their value “accrue[s] directly to humans without
passing through the economy at all. In many cases people are not even
aware of them.”20 That is, “economic markets . . . only reveal demand
for marketed goods and services.”21
Of course, exclusion from the marketplace has not diminished the
value of these services or, more specifically, has not altered the
dependency of the human welfare on the continued receipt of ecosystem
services. The value of the world’s ecosystem services has been
estimated to exceed the global GNP by 1.8 times, highlighting “that
ecosystem services provide an important portion of the total contribution
to human welfare on this planet.”22 As dynamic and complex systems of
interaction between living organisms and non-living environment,
ecosystems “provide basic life support for human and animal
populations and are the source of spiritual, aesthetic, and other human
experiences that are valued in many ways by many people.”23
16. James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson & Gretchen Daily, Protecting Ecosystem Services:
Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 311 (2001).
17. The terms “ecosystem processes” and “ecosystem services” are both used, but not
interchangeably: “Ecosystem processes are essential for the provision of ecosystem services but
processes are not synonymous with services. Until there is some person somewhere benefiting from
an ecological process, it is only a process and not an ecosystem service.” Tallis & Polasky, supra
note 1.
18. In addition to the scant attention given to ecosystem services by the market, the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has recently acknowledged that its regulation of
environmental quality has largely omitted the analysis involved in the ecosystem services approach.
EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., supra note 14 (“Despite the importance of these ecological effects, EPA
policy analyses have tended to focus on a limited set of ecological endpoints, such as those specified
in tests for pesticide regulation (e.g., effects on the survival, growth, and reproduction of aquatic
invertebrates, fish, birds, mammals, and terrestrial and aquatic plants) or specified in laws
administered by the Agency (e.g., mortality to fish, birds, plants, and animals).”).
19. Salzman, Thompson & Daily, supra note 16.
20. Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 Nature 253, 257 (1997).
21. Ida Kubiszewski et al., The Production and Allocation of Information as a Good that is
Enhanced with Increased Use, 69 ECOL. ECON. 1344, 1347 (2010) (“However, many important
goods and services are, in practice, ‘non-excludable’ and cannot be effectively privately owned.”).
22. Costanza et al., supra note 20, at 259. See also, Daily et al., Benefits Supplied by Natural
Ecosystems, supra note 2; WALTER V. REID ET AL., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
SYNTHESIS v (2005).
23. EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., supra note 14.
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By demanding a deeper, more functional understanding and
valuation of the benefits derived from functioning ecosystems, the
ecosystem services approach demands consideration of these previously
ignored ecosystem functions.24 This more complete analysis of assets—
and by extension, more complete analysis of the cost of losing such
services—results from the combination of ecology and economics found
in ecosystem services:
The science of ecology has largely been devoted to exploring the
importance of ecosystem processes in natural contexts, but has ignored
exploration of human service values until recently. Similarly,
economics as a discipline focuses on pricing in markets, but without
information from ecologists about the delivery to humans of ecosystem
services, the market necessarily will underrepresent those values in
pricing and resource allocation decisions. Researchers in both fields,
however, have begun to bridge the gap, to fill in the very large hole of
knowledge surrounding how ecologically important ecosystem
25
attributes are economically valuable services to humans.

Unfortunately, the value of many ecosystem services is hidden
because the extent of human reliance on and benefits from the ecosystem
processes that sustain such services are invisible until those processes
are lost or disrupted.26 Therefore, ecosystem services are critical pieces
of an asset inventory on any scale. Such an inventory can provide
baseline economic and environmental information to contextualize
evidence that alterations in a landscape will “change the benefits
associated with human activities or change the costs of those
activities.”27 An accounting of natural capital can also illustrate the

24. John Porter et al., The Value of Producing Food, Energy, and Ecosystem Services within
an Agro-Ecosystem, 38 AMBIO 186, 186 (2009).
25. J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 24 (2007).
26. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON ASSESSING AND VALUING THE SERVICES OF
AQUATIC AND RELATED TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARDS
BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 154 (2004) (“[T]he value of ecosystem services
becomes apparent only after such services are diminished or lost, which occurs once the natural
processes supporting the production of these services have been sufficiently degraded.”); Gretchen
C. Daily, Introduction: What are Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL
DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 5 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (“[T]he nature and value
of Earth’s life-support systems have been illuminated primarily through their disruption and loss.”).
27. Such circumstances have value “insofar as they either change the benefits associated with
human activities or change the costs or those activities.” Costanza et al., supra note 20, at 255. See
also Gretchen C. Daily et al., Ecosystem Services in Decision Making: Time to Deliver, 7 FRONT
ECOL. ENVIRON 21, 23 (2009) [hereinafter Daily et al., Decision Making] (“The main aim in
understanding and valuing natural capital and ecosystem services is to make better decisions,
resulting in better actions relating to the use of land, water, and other elements of natural capital.”).
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consequences of policies that allocate rights to extract, use, or transfer
natural resources by allowing for an analysis of discontinued ecological
benefits.
B.

The Informational Mandates of NEPA

Informational laws and regulations seek a variety of results,
including the facilitation of a more informed and participatory public
and more informed decision makers, both of which could operate to
avoid poor natural resource decisions. NEPA, as an example of an
informational law,28 was initially adopted to insert a planning component
into the normal progression of governmental decision-making. Congress
enacted NEPA “[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man.”29 This general declaration of purpose does seem to suggest a
substantive policy of sustainable decision-making and effective longterm resource protection. NEPA provides as follows:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity on
the interrelations of all components of the natural environment,
particularly the profound influences of population growth, high-density
urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and
expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical
importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the
overall welfare and development of [humankind], declares that it is the
continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
30
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.

To implement this policy, Congress directed agencies “to the fullest
extent possible” to interpret and administer laws with such ideas in
mind, and also to engage the decision making process in a way that
enhances consideration of the “unquantified environmental amenities
and values” alongside of economic and technical considerations. NEPA
requires decision makers to be informed; NEPA requires that the
probable environmental impacts from a given action be studied before an

28.
29.
30.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (1970).
Id. at § 4321.
Id.
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agency commits to an action.31 Specifically, Congress required that the
federal government:
[I]nclude in every recommendation or report . . . a detailed statement
by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the
proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed
32
action should it be implemented.

At least conceptually, an ecosystem services analysis fits well into each
of these elements of the “detailed statement.”33 An analysis of disrupted
ecosystem services certainly suggests impacts to the environment,
including ones that cannot be avoided. Such an analysis will provide a
basis to compare alternatives to the proposed action, including the
differences between a short-term capture of ecosystem goods and the
long-term benefit of functioning ecosystems. Similarly, an ecosystem
services analysis will involve a valuation of those resources that are
related to, and dependent on, the continuation of ecosystem processes for
their productivity.
Agency compliance with the full directives of NEPA has been slow
and contentious.34 Nevertheless, much of the administrative process is
now driven by NEPA procedures, including public review of
environmental impacts and the preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement (“EIS”).35 In this process, NEPA burdens federal actions
heavily with information-gathering and transparent environmental
review.36 NEPA “impose[s] on agencies an affirmative obligation to
seek out information concerning the environmental consequences of

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Robert L. Fischman, The EPA’s NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVT.
L.J. 497, 507 (2001) (Although valuation of ecosystem services could aid in the analysis of any of
these five issues, it is the fourth issue, concerned with the long-term productivity of the
environment, which has the strongest connection to the work of ecological economists. It is the
long-term productivity of soils, waters, and habitats that provide the services, such as pollution
assimilation, that these researchers seek to quantify.).
34. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v, United States Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
36. Id.
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proposed federal actions.”37
Agencies are required to include
information in environmental review relating to reasonably foreseeable
adverse impacts where the information “is essential to a reasoned choice
among alternatives and the overall costs of obtaining it are not
exorbitant.”38 Where information is difficult to obtain because “the
overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the means to obtain it are
not known,” the agency is still required to identify and explain the
significance of the missing information. In addition, the scope of
information demanded by NEPA seems sufficiently broad to cover a
wide variety of impacts in terms of type and intensity and across time.39
NEPA requires an analysis of direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts
from a proposed action.40
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of the NEPA obligation
is the assemblage of baseline ecological information.41 Robert Fischman
contemplates a substantial investment in baseline information early in
the NEPA process:
The establishment of an environmental baseline combines both the
CEQ requirements to obtain information and address cumulative
impacts. Once the study area is defined, the agency should collect
baseline environmental data, determine gaps in the data, and design
methods for collecting missing data. It must ensure that the analysts
have access to data that will allow them to assess “past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable” effects. The analyst may need habitat
inventories, water quality surveys, and studies of social and economic
patterns in a community. In some cases the collection of data may
require sampling over four seasons or longer periods to ensure an
understanding of the existing community social interactions,
socioeconomic state, environmental conditions, or ecosystem
processes. Historical data can sometimes be used to supplement the
42
baseline database.

Such information provides what may be the only basis for understanding
and quantifying environmental impacts after the commencement of
construction (and perhaps even post-completion), especially where a
project diverges from its original plan (such as to adapt to changing
market preferences) or where construction encounters unforeseen

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a) (2013).
42 U.S.C. § 4321.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.25 (2013).
42 U.S.C. § 4321.
Fischman, supra note 33, at 513-14.
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impacts (such as the accumulation of changes from construction
processes and natural disasters).
II. THE EXAMPLE THAT CONFUSES THE RULE: CLINCH COALITION
Mandates included in informational statutes, such as the National
Environmental Policy Act and the “little NEPAs” in the states, should
have proven (and may yet prove) to be effective vehicles for integrating
ecosystem services concepts into watershed, ecosystem, and other
natural resource system management.43 As Robert Fischman has argued,
NEPA is “particularly well suited for the valuation of ecosystem
services” due to the relationship between ecosystem services and the
substantive goals of NEPA,44 because ecosystem valuation would
provide important but often ignored information necessary to informed
decision making. And, further, because “valuation is in a state of
development where a moderate increase in demand for information from
the government would substantially advance the precision of valuation
techniques.”45 Furthermore, NEPA46 is one of the very few regulatory
tools that compels the aggregated consideration of environmental
impacts on multiples levels and at multiple scales.
Given the purposes of the informational mandate of NEPA,47 it may
be difficult to grasp a judicial disposition that trivializes ecosystem
function through a dismissive understanding of ecosystem services.
Nevertheless, the courts have adopted ecosystem services in a fractured
manner at best. NEPA has been construed as an action forcing statute,
but one that is largely devoid of substantive standards.48 Therefore, in
Robertson v. Methow Valley,49 the Ninth Circuit noted that “it would not
have violated NEPA if the Forest Service, after complying with the
Act’s procedural prerequisites, had decided that the benefits to be

43. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
44. NEPA requires federal agencies to “use all practicable means and measures, including
financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated . . . to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,” and also to balance the needs of
present and future generations, assure healthful and productive surroundings, “attain the widest
range of beneficial uses of the environment,” and enhance environmental quality. 42 U.S.C.
4331(a)-(b) (1970).
45. Fischman, supra note 33, at 535.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
47. Id.
48. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-228 (198)
(per curiam); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
49. Robertson v. Methow Valley, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
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derived from downhill skiing at Sandy Butte justified the issuance of a
special use permit, notwithstanding the loss of 15 percent, 50 percent, or
even 100 percent of the mule deer herd.”50 The court concluded that
although “[o]ther statutes may impose substantive environmental
obligations on federal agencies . . . NEPA merely prohibits uninformedrather than unwise-agency action.”51 At issue in the Robertson
controversy was not the loss of ecosystem services suffered from the
loss of mule deer.52 Nevertheless, the courts have indicated a reluctance
to open the NEPA53 process to ecosystem services.
The controversy in Clinch Coalition v. Damon54 arose in the
context of a proposed timber sale affecting public lands in the Bark
Camp Area of the Jefferson National Forest.55 It is relevant that this
case implicated the scope of an agency’s informational duties under
NEPA.56 Although the District Court did not expressly disagree with
Fishman’s vision for NEPA, it also rejected an understanding of NEPA
that would require consideration of ecosystem services.57
The Clinch Coalition controversy began with the observation that
the Bark Camp Area was not in conformity with the Jefferson National
Forest Management Plan.58 The Jefferson National Forest was created in
1936 and, after it was combined with the George Washington National
Forest in 1995, contained a geographical expense of 1.8 million acres of
land spread over Virginia, Kentucky, and West Virginia.59 Initially, the
Jefferson Forest was comprised on “lands nobody wanted” due to the
resource extraction impacts and the transformative character of past uses
of the land.60 The Bark Camp area has since been maintained as a
popular recreational destination, as well as subject to the continuing
50. Id. at 351.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 332.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
54. Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004).
55. Areas designated in the National Forest system are intended to “improve and protect the
forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and
to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States.”
16 U.S.C.A. § 475 (1987). Areas designated as National Forests are “administered for outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” 16 U.S.C.A. § 528 (1960).
56. Clinch Coalition, 316 F. Supp. 2d.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 369.
59. See Revised Land and Resource Management Plan: Jefferson Nat’l Forest, U.S. DEP’T
OF
AGRICULTURE
1-6
(2004),
available
at
http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fsbdev3_000381.pdf.
60. Id. at 2-2 (“[B]y the early 1990s, much of the higher elevation mountains and ridges in
southwestern Virginia had been transformed into charred stumps and brushfields.”).
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extraction of oil and gas.61 The Management Plan called for the careful
management of a diverse array of habitats to support a diverse
population of wildlife.62 Yet, due in large part to the character and
content of past forest management practices in the Jefferson National
Forest, the Forest Service predicted that the Bark Camp Area would
soon be devoid of early successional habitat.63 To remedy this
deficiency, the Forest Service formulated a vegetation management plan
for the Bark Camp Area that was intended to bring the Area into
conformance.64 The plan included a finding that the objectives of the
action would be best served by including commercial harvest of timber
of approximately 700 acres of the Area.65
In furtherance of this plan, the Forest Service prepared an
Environmental Assessment (“EA”) under NEPA.66 The EA examined
the potential impacts of timber harvest on watershed functions due to
sedimentation, considered the mitigation opportunities presented by the
principles of the largely degree program, and discussed the economic
impacts of the proposed timber sale.67 The EA concluded that the
sedimentation impacts were negligible, and that any short-term adverse
impacts of timber sale on recreational uses would be offset by a longterm benefit from proper vegetation management.68
The plaintiffs relied on a variety of legal sources—Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act (“MUSYA”),69 the Forest and Rangeland
Renewable Resources Planning Act (“FRRRPA”),70 the National Forest
Management Act (“NFMA”),71 NEPA,72 and Forest Service regulatory
documents—to argue that the Forest Service was required to perform an
ecosystem services analysis of the impacts of the proposed timber sale.
The opponents to the sale called for an ecosystem services analysis and
argued the area “may very well be acre for acre the greatest natural area

61. Clinch Coalition, 316 F.Supp.2d at 369.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 370.
65. Id. Opposition groups take credit for compelling the Forest Service to reduce the size of
the proposed Bark Camp timber sale, which was first announced in 1997 to encompass 1,413 acres.
Hacking
Away
at
High
Knob,
GREENPEACE,
USA
(Oct.
1,
2004),
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/news-and-blogs/news/the-high-knob-area-of-the-jeff/.
66. 42 USC §4321 (1970).
67. Clinch Coalition, 316 F.Supp.2d at 370.
68. Id. at 371.
69. 16 U.S.C. §528 (1960).
70. 16 U.S.C. §1600 (1960).
71. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Plans, 16 USC §1604 (1976).
72. 42 U.S.C §4321 (1970).
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in all of Virginia and one of the greatest east of the Mississippi River.”73
The court was unable to locate an ecosystem services demand in the
multiple use directive of the MUSYA, which requires “the management
of all the various renewable surface resources of the national forests so
that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of
the American people,”74 and found the statutory language “far from
being a directive by Congress that the forest service must utilize a
specific economic analysis, let alone the one Plaintiffs assert is
required.”75 However, MUSYA also requires the Forest Service to give
“due consideration” for the “relative values of the various resources in
particular areas,”76 a directive that appears to require an analysis of the
costs and benefits from a specific use. The court insisted that “MUSYA
contains no specific mandate that the Forest Service utilize a particular
procedure to analyze the economic impacts of a proposed project and its
alternatives.”77
Likewise, the district court rejected the Plaintiffs’ reliance on
language in FRRRPA requiring management of forestlands “to secure
the maximum benefits of multiple sustained yield management,”78
finding “no clear direction from Congress mandating that the Forest
Service gather the information by any particular economic analysis
method.”79 The court found no provision in NFMA “that mandates a
particular methodology, particularly a methodology that quantifies the
impact of timber harvesting on non-timber values,”80 a conclusion
bolstered by legislative history that identified “only direct timber

73. Unique
Features
of
High
Knob,
THE
CLINCH
COALITION,
http://clinchcoalition.net/index.php?pr=unique (last visited Jan. 31, 2013). Objectors voiced a
concern that the Bark Camp timber sale would cause irreversible damage to important ecosystem
processes in the area:
While only 1% of the logging will be “clearcut” as the Forest Service defines it, the logging will remove most of the forest canopy in the 700-acre area. Forest canopy is crucial
to protect younger trees and wildlife and to shade the understory. Several ecologically
sensitive areas are included in the timber sale, such as winter hibernation habitat for the
endangered Indiana bat. The Clinch River, just six miles downstream from the timber
sale area, is recognized worldwide for its tremendous aquatic diversity. The watershed is
home to 27 species that are federally listed as threatened or endangered-the highest concentration of federally protected species in the country.
Hacking Away at High Knob, supra note 65.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 531 (1960).
75. Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F.Supp.2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 531 (1960).
77. Clinch Coalition, 316 F. Supp.2d at 378.
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1601(d)(1) (1960).
79. Clinch Coalition, 316 F. Supp.2d at 378-79.
80. Id. at 379.
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production costs and returns” for analysis.81 Although the court
recognized that NEPA requires an economic analysis, it found that “the
Forest Service complied with such mandate” in the EA, as NEPA “does
not direct the Forest Service to use a particular economic accounting
methodology, especially not the method asserted by plaintiffs that would
require quantification of on non-timber values.”82 The district court left
the matter of ecosystem services to the discretion of the Forest Service,
largely unimpressed that an ecosystem services analysis would add to
the process of taking a “hard look” at adverse environmental impacts.83
III. CRITICAL OF CLINCH: ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AS BETTER
INFORMATION
An examination of the Clinch Coalition court’s reasoning suggests
a misunderstanding of what the ecosystem services approach entails,
demands, and adds to the set of information that is made available to
decision makers and resource managers.84 Yet, the Clinch Coalition
decision could prove to be benign.85 Legislative or regulatory
developments could provide specific guidance on the appropriate
employment of ecosystem services principles with the understanding
that resources decision should not be made without all of the necessary
information. On the other hand, the court’s categorization of ecosystem
services could instead provide a safe haven for shortsighted resource
planning.
This section addresses the Clinch Coalition decision by borrowing
insights from economics.86 Specifically, this section looks to the role of
information in avoiding market inefficiencies—an insight that has
proven important in analyzing the recent failure of the financial
institutions:87
The current economic crisis has highlighted the need for government
intervention in the event of the failure of a systemically important
81. Id.
82. Id. at 380-81.
83. Id. at 364.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. We are mindful of the notion that framing causes despair in cross-disciplinary ventures,
particularly when the relevant insights are not correlative. Another way of making this point:
“knowing how ecosystem services operate ecologically will not guarantee sound economic and
policy decisions about the environment, but not knowing how ecosystem services operate
ecologically will guarantee unsound economic and policy decisions. So economists have something
to learn as well.” J.B. RUHL ET AL., supra note 25, at 35.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 6
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 5 HIROKAWA (DO NOT DELETE)

978

AKRON LAW REVIEW

10/10/2013 9:27 AM

[46:963

institution. But the need for massive intervention implies, in turn, the
need to take actions to prevent the occurrence of such failures in the
first place. Sometimes the damage done by actions that have adverse
effects on others can be compensated for after the fact, but in the cases
at hand, this is in general not possible. Policy interventions should be
designed to make less likely the occurrence of actions that generate
88
significant negative spillovers, or externalities.

Economics explains the importance of informational regulatory
interventions because it supports the value of avoiding market failures
that result from incomplete information, and as such, explains the value
of regulations that employ informational mechanisms to avoid market
failure.89 Because economics directs the information-gathering process
towards a larger set of relevant and important information, this
framework will prove applicable to the informational needs in
environmental regulation.
A.

The Economic Framework for Environmental Policy

One of the most fundamental concepts of neoclassical economic
theory is that markets that are competitive and free of government
intervention90 are the most efficient means of allocating and managing
the resources (including natural resources) which are necessary for the
production of goods and services. Adam Smith contended that free
markets lead to efficient outcomes “as if by an invisible hand,”91 an
assertion that has since been adapted by both economists and noneconomists to argue for the efficacy of free markets. From this
perspective, government regulation of private choices, public ownership
of resources, and the provision of public goods and services interferes
with the efficient allocation of resources.92

88. Joseph E Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 11-23
(David A. Moss & John A. Cisternino eds., 2009).
89. Joseph E Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation
(Paper Prepared for the Tobin Project’s conference on Government and Markets: Toward a New
Theory of Regulation) (Yulee, Florida, Feb. 1-3, 2008) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Government Failure v.
Market Failure].
90. Including regulation and/or the provision of public goods and services.
91. Joseph E Stiglitz, Columbia Business School, Nobel Prize Lecture: Information and the
Change in the Paradigm in Economics (Dec. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Information and the
Change in the Paradigm in Economics].
92. Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare Economics,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND
PROBABILITY 507-32 (Jerzy Neyman ed., 1951); GÉRARD DEBREU, THE THEORY OF VALUE (Yale
Univ. Press 1959).
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The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics provides a
mathematically rigorous basis for the argument that competitive markets
free from government intervention allocate and manage resources
efficiently. The form in which this theorem is stated today and the
conditions under which it holds true is generally attributed to 1950s
economists Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu.93 The theorem sets
forth a set of conditions, including the well-defined ownership or
property rights to the goods and services and the availability of perfect
information, under which Adam Smith’s invisible hand works
perfectly.94 Competitive markets in which these conditions strictly hold
achieve Pareto efficiency (i.e. no one in society can be made better off
without making someone else in society worse off).95 Given competitive
markets for goods and services, perfect information, and well-defined
property rights, society’s economic resources are allocated efficiently.96
Government intervention in markets would be superfluous, or worse,
disruptive.
Most environmental problems that are framed in economic terms
are posed as the failure of markets to correctly value environmental
goods and services, a result of which is the creation of “externalities.”97
In theory, if all of the costs and benefits inherent in the production and
consumption of goods and services are known and borne by market
participants in the form of market prices, no externalities would result
from market transactions.98 Given that the economic theory behind
perfectly functioning markets is based on a number of assumptions that
are simply not realistic (especially in terms of environmental resources),
some type of government intervention is required to internalize the
externalities created through the production and consumption of goods
and services.
Regulatory efforts to correct for environmental
externalities have traditionally included the use of direct interventions
such as proscriptions (things producers may not do), or mandates (things
producers must do). Often referred to as “command-and control”
measures,99 these types of regulatory interventions have been found easy
93. Arrow, supra note 92, at 507-32; DEBREU, supra note 92.
94. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, supra note 91.
95. Issues of equity or distribution are not addressed in Pareto outcomes.
96. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, supra note 91.
97. Loosely defined to reference the social, economic and environmental costs and benefits
created in either the production or consumption of goods and services that are not borne by the
decision makers in the market (i.e. cost and benefits not reflected in market prices).
98. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
7 (Cambridge Univ. 2d ed. 1988).
99. Erwin H. Bulte et al., Payments for ecosystem services and poverty reduction: concepts,
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to mandate but inefficient to implement.100
More recently, environmental policy has focused on creating what
are called market-based instruments (“MBIs”).101 As de Groot argues,
“[o]ne major reason for the continued loss and degradation of
ecosystems is that the value (importance) of ecosystems to human
welfare is still underestimated in most economic development decisions
because the benefits of their services are not, or only partly, captured in
conventional market economics.”102 The majority of the goods and
services that ecosystems produce are not valued in current markets. The
exceptions are often only valued as positive externalities resulting from
the non-conversion of natural resources into products for the
marketplace. Given that markets for the productive capabilities of
ecosystems are often incomplete or even “missing,” resource managers
lack the sufficient incentives necessary to invest in maintenance or
preservation of ecosystem services.
Neoclassical market theory
maintains that in the absence of market price incentives which created
through private ownership, natural resources will be unvalued or
underpriced, creating incentives for society to use more of those
resources than is socially efficient.103
In order to correct for
undervaluation and overconsumption of natural resources, government
intervention is required to create the missing incentives or markets.104
Instead of attempting to force adherence to market regulations,
environmental policy that creates MBIs attempts to use economic
incentives to change the behavior of market participants. There are two
main forms of MBIs: (1) pollution taxes and subsidies and (2) tradable
pollution permits.105
Although there have been many successes in creating market-based
instruments106 (such as emission trading schemes),107 their potential is

issues, and empirical perspectives, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 13, 245-254
(2008).
100. Id.
101. Robert Starvins & Bradley Whitehead, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY (Marian Chertow & Daniel Esty eds., Yale Univ. Press 1997).
102. Rudolf
de
Groot,
Ecosystem
Services,
IUNC
(Jan.
31,
2013),
http://www.iucn.org/about/union/commissions/cem/cem_work/cem_services/.
103. BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 98 at 7.
104. Forest Reinhardt, Market Failure and the Environmental Policies of Firms: Economic
Rationales for “Beyond Compliance” Behavior, 3 J. INDUST. ECOLOGY, no. 1, 1999, at 9–21.
105. ASAFU-ADJAYE, U.N. ECON. & SOC. COMM’N FOR ASIA & THE PAC., INTEGRATING
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: THE CASE OF PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES:
DEVELOPMENT PAPERS NO. 25 (2004).
106. Robert Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 31-2 (Paul Portney & Robert Stavins eds., 2000).
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considered limited.108 As Wegnera and Pascualb argue, “[i]ndividuals
may perceive intangible benefits from nature, may not always have
sufficient understanding of ecosystem services, and may not always
decide independently from others on what value to attribute to
ecosystem services.”109 Given that the theoretical conditions necessary
for markets to produce an efficient allocation of resources never hold,
there is no guarantee that using market based instruments to incentivize
resource managers will generate more efficient management of natural
resources or that they will prevent resource use from passing ecological
tipping points. At the end of the day, “the notion of economic value is
of little use when an ecosystem approaches a critical ecological
threshold and ecosystem services become non-substitutable and
absolutely scarce.”110
B.

The Role of Information and Informational Regulation

Information about the role and value of natural capital affects
decision making about how resources are used in every context: on a
personal level, within organizations and firms, in political processes.
Although the failure of markets to capture and prevent environmental
externalities and to create the incentives necessary for the efficient use
of natural resources are both significant considerations, such issues
derive from an availability of information about the total economic and
ecological value of natural resources.111 Theoretically, a complete set of
information about the quantity and quality of all of the goods and
services that natural resources produce, and the role and the value of the
natural resources themselves, would be available to all decision makers
and resource managers. Decision makers would also have complete
information regarding all of the opportunity costs that would be created
in the conversion of natural resources into goods and services for the
market, and all of the benefits of maintaining the natural resources in
107. Pavan Sukhdev, Putting a Price on Nature: The Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity,
1
SOLUTIONS,
no.
6,
at
34-43,
available
at
http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/823.
108. Frank Ackerman & Kevin Gallagher, Getting the Prices Wrong: The Limits of Marketbased Environmental Policy (Global Dev. & Envtl. Inst., Working Paper No. 00-05, 2000).
109. Giulia Wegner & Unai Pascualb, Cost-benefit analysis in the context of ecosystem
services for human well-being: a multidisciplinary critique (Ecosystem Servs. Econ., Working
Paper No. 13, 2000), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.12.008.
110. Id.
111. A key theoretical assumption of neoclassical economics is that “humans are omniscient
actors; that is to say, we have complete information and perfect understanding of our set of choices,
and hence we can always form preferences over goods and services.” Id.
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their current state for other current and future production possibilities.
Given complete information and a competitive market for the goods and
services which resources produce,112 collective decision making would
lead to the most efficient allocation of resources.
The problem faced when projecting the economic framework to
problem solving is that information available to decision makers can
never be complete or perfect. Producers and consumers of goods and
services inevitably lack sufficient information about the social,
economic and environmental impacts of their production and
consumption decisions. In addition, we lack sufficient information
about the role and value of the goods and services, which ecologies in
and of themselves create. Limited by the availability information,
markets fail to reflect the full social and economic costs and benefits of
the production or consumption of a good or service or of the conversion
of natural resources into goods or services. As a consequence, markets
will not provide Pareto efficiency.113 Given imperfect or incomplete
information, the market outcome will not be the most efficient or
beneficial societal allocation of our natural resources.114
Where incomplete information leads to the failure of the market to
provide an efficient use of resources, the provision of a larger set of
information should resolve the inefficiency.
By requiring the
availability of a larger and more inclusive set of relevant (and
symmetrical)115 information before resource decisions are made, the
more we move towards efficient outcomes. As such, and given the
relationship between incomplete information and the failure of markets
to provide the most efficient or beneficial allocation of resources,
government interventions that mandate information-gathering and
disclosure may be thought to increase societal and economic efficiency
by making Pareto improvements to the circumstances.116 As Greenwald
and Stiglitz have highlighted, “[m]arket forces do not necessarily lead to
full (or efficient) disclosure of information,” leading to the conclusion
that “there is a good rationale for disclosure requirements. Markets
cannot function well with distorted and imperfect information; hence,
requirements that lead to improved information can (by and large) lead

112. Ceterus parabus, assuming all other first theorem conditions hold.
113. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect
Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 QUARTERLY J. ECON., no. 2, 1986, at, 229-264.
114. Market Failure and Ecological Goods and Services.
115. Vs. asymmetrical information, where one party in a transaction has more or superior
information compared to another.
116. Greenwald & Stiglitz, supra note 113.
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to better resource allocations.”117
Not Just Another “Economic Methodology”

C.

Given the foregoing introduction to information and its role in
making Pareto improvements, it is worth noting that the Clinch
Coalition court did not opine that an ecosystem services analysis would
yield less or inadequate information.118 The court did not rule that an
ecosystem services analysis would violate informational duties relevant
to the timber sale.119 Rather, the court ruled that ecosystem services
represented an alternative method of information gathering and
assessment; presumably, that it would yield the same information but
package it differently.120 Such a ruling misunderstands the relationship
between ecosystem services and the economic concept of efficient
resource management.
Given the history of drive toward investigating ecosystems and
nonmarket worth, it is not surprising to see some resistance against
ecosystem services principles. J.B. Ruhl and his colleagues note that
“estimates of nonmarket ecosystem service value is perhaps the most
vexing in the long run in terms of policy development [because] . . . non
market value estimates are essentially models of economic value rather
than the direct measure that market prices provide.”121 However, by
characterizing ecosystem services as merely another economic theory or
accounting method, the court seems to have missed the profound
contribution that information about ecosystem services makes to
efficient and sustainable environmental decision making in both the
short- and long-run, and to well-functioning markets for natural
resources.122 The court has also somewhat diminished the spirit of
NEPA by discounting the critical value of information in decisionmaking and in the efficient management of natural resources.123
The study of ecosystem services punctuates the idea that natural
capital is exhaustible and demonstrates the falsity of the notion that
human productivity “operates at too small a scale relative to natural
processes to interfere with the free provision of natural goods and

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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services.”124 Such “free” services must be accounted for to accurately
reflect the costs of losing such services. An analysis of relevant
ecosystem services helps to identify the types of information not
recognized or accounted for in other valuation approaches. It is
important to note, for instance, that the market has borne little
information on the value of photosynthesis: “[o]ne does not have to
purchase photosynthesis or the radiation screening effects of the ozone
layer, and therefore no data on market price are available for them.” 125
In contrast, ecosystem services valuation centralizes the notion that
ecosystems “provide basic life support for human and animal
populations and are the source of spiritual, aesthetic, and other human
experiences that are valued in many ways by many people.”126 As such,
“[a]ssessing ecosystem services implies focusing on how the
environment contributes to people’s well-being.”127 Included in this
analysis are access to extractable and marketable resources, nutrition and
water, security, and sense of place and identity. The ecosystem services
analysis requires an identification of the benefits and beneficiaries of
relevant baseline ecosystem processes so that a proper and accurate
accounting can be made after a proposed ecological transformation.
The ecosystem services analysis also provides an estimate of the
costs of using and losing the ecosystems and ecosystem processes that
produce goods and services, and as such, falls squarely into the demands
of our resource management goals.128 WRI notes that substantial
benefits from employing ecosystem services analysis may particularly
obtain on projects that:
 May lead to ecosystem change in contexts where people
and communities have a high level of dependency on
ecosystems to maintain their livelihoods and cultural
identity and are therefore of vulnerable to ecosystem
change. This includes remote areas that are opening to
development.
 Depend on ecosystem services and are therefore vulnerable
124. Robert Costanza & Herman E. Daly, Natural Capital and Sustainable Development, 6
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 37, 39 (1992).
125. Ruhl et al., supra note 25.
126. U.S. EPA, SCI. ADVISORY BD., VALUING THE PROTECTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
AND SERVICES 8 (2009).
127. Florence Landsberg et al., Ecosystem Services Review for Impact Assessment:
Introduction and Guide to Scoping 4 (WRI, Working Paper, Nov. 2011), available at
http://ecosystemcommons.org/sites/default/files/wri_esr_for_ia_wp1.pdf.
128. See Keith H. Hirokawa, Disaster and Ecosystem Services: From the Cuyahoga to the
Deepwater Horizon, 74 ALB. L. REV. 543 (2010/2011).
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to ecosystem change. This includes projects that, for
example, share water resources with other stakeholders, or
require erosion control for viability.
 Are controversial and require the developer to be proactive
in their relations with affected people to avoid legal battles
or delays in project implementation or operation. This
includes areas where citizens are actively involved and
likely to demand project oversight.129
In these circumstances, in which the needs and dependencies of
ecosystem beneficiaries are brought to the fore, the ecosystem services
analysis helps to establish values and terms that can capture the
relevance of ecosystem changes to local, regional, and national
audiences. Such insights were lost in the court’s reliance on legislative
history to reject the plaintiffs’ NFMA argument: “Costs and benefits
attributable to other resource values should be excluded because of the
lack of certainty involved in assigning values to other benefits derived
and the impact on multiple use goals.”130 In the two decades that have
passed between the legislative statement and the development of the
economic analysis in ecosystem services, ecosystem services analysis
has proven purposeful precisely in filling the information gap and
providing greater “certainty . . . in assigning values to other benefits
derived.”131 Ecosystem services accounting is premised on economic
principles and provides a fuller view of costs and benefits. Ecosystem
services insights are not alternative to market values.
D.

Ecosystem Services Analysis Provides Better Information

A recognition and valuation of ecosystem services is essential to
governmental decision-making, community identity, and economic
opportunity. The benefits produced by ecosystem services compel an
understanding of ecosystems that recognizes not only the commodity
values of goods produced by ecosystems, but also the value of the
essential services that ecosystems provide. Indeed, our relationship with
nature is one of dependency:
Natural systems provide foundational economic goods and services
including oxygen, water, land, food, climate stability, storm and flood

129. Landsberg et al., supra note 127.
130. Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F.Supp. 2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004) (citing S. REP. NO. 94893 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6662, 6667 (1976)) (italics added).
131. Daily et al., Benefits Supplied by Natural Ecosystems, supra note 2, at 2; Costanza et al.,
supra note 20.
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protection, recreation, aesthetic value, raw materials, minerals, and
energy. All “built capital” is made of natural capital, including cars,
buildings and food. An economy also requires hurricane protection, a
stable climate, waste assimilation and other natural services. No
economy can function without nature’s provision of economic goods
132
and services.

Economies do not operate independently of natural capital, and as such,
do not operate independently of ecosystems and ecosystem processes.
Based on these insights, it might seem intuitively compelling to
seek more information on the processes by which ecosystems serve
human needs. Yet, conventional markets, as endorsed by law, generally
lack the requisite mechanisms to incentivize information gathering of the
types of information that are essential to the valuation of public goods,
including information relating to the protection of ecosystem services.
Conventional markets discourage such information or otherwise change
the question: “the root of the problem for ecosystem services has been
the law’s utilitarian premise that developing natural resources invariably
puts land to higher and better uses and maximizes social welfare where
both are measured in monetary terms.”133
This comparison—the values represented by ecosystem services
and conventional valuation—does call into question the difficult task of
identifying which and how much information is relevant to the problemsolving function of informational regulations. Here, understanding
natural resource management through the economic framework provides
tools that illustrate the relevant role of ecosystem services to the
regulatory process. Regulation that mandates consideration of a more
complete set of information concerning the environmental and economic
impacts of resource use ensures more efficient management of resources
by correcting for resource market inefficiencies resulting from
incomplete information. Ecosystem services analysis generates a more
complete set of information to decision makers than traditional
economic/environmental analyses (such as cost-benefit analyses). An
engaged investigation into relevant ecosystem services will discover the
ecosystem processes that sustain those services of value to local
communities and those other beneficiaries of such services.
132. DAVID BATKER ET AL., GAINING GROUND: WETLANDS, HURRICANES AND THE
ECONOMY: THE VALUE OF RESTORING THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER DELTA 7 (2010), available at
http://www.eartheconomics.org/FileLibrary/file/Reports/Louisiana/Earth_Economics_Report_on_th
e_Mississippi_River_Delta_compressed.pdf.
133. Christopher L. Lant, The Tragedy of Ecosystem Services, 58 BIOSCIENCE 969, 972 (Nov.
2008).
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In neoclassical economic theory, the value of natural resources is
limited to that of an input in the production function. The more natural
capital is extracted and converted through the production process, the
greater our capacity to produce the goods and services that increase
society’s wellbeing. In traditional market-based valuations of natural
resources, only the benefit of converting resources through the
production process is compared to the cost of converting those resources
(including present and future costs and benefits inherent in the
conversion of the resources into goods and services). The ecosystem
services perspective not only recognizes that natural resources are
producers of goods and services, but also that the goods and services
produced by ecosystems might represent a greater economic, social, and
environmental value than the goods and services acquired from the
conversion of those natural resources over time.
The market reluctance to acknowledge ecosystem services is further
illuminated by the types of services that ecosystems provide. Although
the ecosystem services analysis provides a valuation of the services
provided, the basis for that valuation is founded in the continuation of
functions and processes in ecosystems. The range of services provided
by ecosystems may be understood to include the following:
“provisioning services such as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating
services that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality;
cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual
benefits; and supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis,
and nutrient cycling.”134 These ecosystem services illustrate our
economic dependence on ecosystems, not as resources to be converted,
but as the producer of goods and services critical to human needs, and
economic and ecological wealth. As discussed above, ecosystem
services employs market theory to assesses costs and benefits in terms
that represent market function. However, the economics of ecosystem
services is ecological; it drives the way we understand the value of
ecosystems and ecosystem functions, and as such, it largely determines
the character of the ecological information that is gathered and the logic
that such information invokes, such as whether the information indicates
a significant adverse impact or a negligible (ecological) cost.
Applying the informational lessons of ecosystem services valuation
to the Clinch Coalition135 decision illustrates the informational
134. WALTER V. REID ET. AL., MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND
HUMAN
WELL-BEING:
SYNTHESIS
v
(2005),
available
at
http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf.
135. Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004).
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advantages of ecosystem services assessment. The Clinch Coalition
decision provides the following description of the Forest Service’s
investigation:
The EA also discussed the economic impacts of the Project, both
qualitatively and quantitatively. The EA included a discussion of the
costs and revenues of the project planning and timber harvest activities
associated with each alternative proposed by the Forest Service. The
EA also concluded that the Project would at first negatively impact
recreational use; however, the Project eventually would benefit
recreational uses through, among other things, improvement of the
view from the High Knob Tower and improvement of access for
dispersed recreational pursuits. The EA also discussed several other
136
economic impacts as well.

In contrast, the plaintiffs asked for a broader and deeper analysis of the
certain impacts from the proposed time harvest:
The Plaintiffs next assert that “[i]n authorizing the Bark Camp timber
sale, the Forest Service failed to account for the significant economic
value associated with clean water, wildlife, recreation, scenery, nontimber forest products, and other non-priced ‘ecosystem services’
generated by the Bark Camp timber sale area in its existing condition.”
In addition, the Plaintiffs assert that the Forest Service failed to
account for the reduction in these economic values, which will result
from logging and road building. Therefore, the Plaintiffs argue that the
economic analysis provided by the Forest Service in the EA used to
justify the Bark Camp timber sale was inadequate under NFMA and
137
NEPA.

The plaintiffs’ request was not based on speculation: logging and road
building unquestionably impact “clean water, wildlife, recreation,
scenery, non-timber forest products, and other non-priced ‘ecosystem
services,’” and these services are associated with significant and readily
available economic values.138 The plaintiffs merely attempted to
illustrate the ways in which “our largely un-marketed ecological wealth
underpins our marketed economic wealth,”139 not by proposing a novel
or alternative methodology, but by proposing that the information be
gathered and calculated in a way that is relevant to impacts on the
economy and on human welfare.
136. Id. at 371.
137. Id. at 377.
138. Id.
139. John Porter et al., The Value of Producing Food, Energy, and Ecosystem Services within
an Agro-Ecosystem, 38 AMBIO 186 (2009).
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Ecosystem services is intended to further inform the regulatory
process by giving a fuller value of resources by reference to ecosystem
processes and the role that any particular ecosystem component might
serve to the functionality of the system. That is, ecosystem services
information is better information: ecosystem services information
provides better baseline information for understanding changes to
ecosystems by facilitating the valuation of those changes. The
ecosystem services approach does not merely assess the value of goods
and services produced by converting natural resources to commodities, it
also demands an accounting of the goods and services that are produced
by the natural resources themselves and the value of production over
time. As such, “[i]t is far better economics to avoid wrecking productive
natural systems, or to restore them when damaged, than attempt to
displace or do without them.”140
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the most interesting features of the ecosystem services
perspective is its youth. The study of the value of ecosystem services is
a recent trend.141 This does not mean that human settlements have been
unable to identify natural systems, or that humans have failed to grasp
the relevance of ecosystem processes, but that our current social and
economic systems have failed to value ecosystems holistically for their
function, location, and interactions. What we are finding, in looking
more closely at the manner in which ecosystem processes benefit human
welfare, is that ecosystems are critical to human survival: “without
ecosystem services, we all die.”142
Policymakers and resource managers are regularly called upon to
prioritize the trade-offs concerning land conversion and environmental
management. These decisions, even when benefitted by environmental
impact statements, are too often made without fully accounting for the
loss of goods and services produced by natural ecosystems.143 Mindful
of the notion that “[a]s a resource, information has unique characteristics
140.
141.

BATKER ET AL., supra note 132.
Harold Mooney & Paul Ehrlich, Ecosystem Services: A Fragmentary History, in
NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 11 (Gretchen C. Daily
ed., 1997); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157, 158-61 (2007) (identifying 1997-98 as the emergence of ecosystem
services analysis).
142. Ruhl et al., supra note 25.
143. Pavan Sukhdev, Putting a Price on Nature: The Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity,
1
SOLUTIONS,
no.
6,
at
34-43,
available
at
http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/823.
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that affect its allocation,”144 this article builds on the potential of
informational regulations to compel effective information gathering.
Regulations play a key role in addressing market failures due to
incomplete information145 by forcing parties to gather and disclose a
larger set of information. Regulations that require the disclosure of
information, which would not necessarily be disclosed through market
forces alone, are useful in seeking the more efficient management of
resources.
The WRI has proposed that ecosystem services analysis, when
addressed in a systemic manner, can provide significant assistance:
 At the scoping stage: systematically and comprehensively
identify the ecosystem services to be addressed in further
stages of [environmental impact review];
 At the impact stage: assess (1) the negative project impact
on ecosystem services in terms of changes in the well-being
of their beneficiaries and (2) the project dependence on
ecosystem services in terms of changes in project
performance; and
 At the mitigation stage: identify options through the
mitigation hierarchy to enhance or at least maintain (1) the
well-being affected beneficiaries derive from ecosystem
services and (2) the performance the project derives from
ecosystem services at acceptable levels.146
When employed as such, an ecosystem services analysis allows
stakeholders to better understand the projected project impacts in useful
terms and in light of tradeoffs, to incorporate the value of co-benefits
from the project or mitigation measures, and to ensure that the decision
is founded on inclusive investigations and valuations. As Fischman
argues, “ecosystem services can broaden the scope of cumulative
analysis by defining the reasonably foreseeable horizon, and can
contribute to making predictions about the type and extent of the
impacts.”147 In this light, the informational application of ecosystem
services analysis can be seen to improve the informational regulation:
“The main aim in understanding and valuing natural capital and
ecosystem services is to make better decisions, resulting in better actions
relating to the use of land, water, and other elements of natural
144. Ida Kubiszewski et al., The Production and Allocation of Information as a Good that is
Enhanced with Increased Use, 69 ECOL. ECON. 1344, 1346 (2010).
145. Stiglitz, Government Failure v. Market Failure, supra note 89.
146. Landsberg, supra note 127, at 3.
147. Fischman, supra note 33.
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capital.”148

148.
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